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# A peek inside the CIA by an ex-No. 3 man

By David Wise

THE REAL CIA. By Lyman B. Kirkpatrick Jr. Macmillan.  
\$6.95.

When the former No. 3 man in the Central Intelligence Agency casts off his cloak to write a book entitled *The Real CIA*, the result, by any logical expectation, should be a total apologia for "the Agency."

But even a \$46,000,000 house in the woods in Langley, Va., is not necessarily a home, as Lyman Kirkpatrick found out in 1965, when, deservedly weary of bureaucratic infighting and the nautical platitudes of Adm. William F. Raborn, then the director, he hied himself off to Brown University to teach cold-war political science.

While he has not abandoned his emotional ties to the agency to which he gave 18 of his best years, Kirkpatrick in the cool New England air has written a book that is considerably less than total in its adoration and at times refreshingly frank. If he does not write with detachment—which would be a lot to expect, anyway—at least he is able to see the warts on the face of the spy.

There are very special reasons for this. Kirkpatrick was no ordinary CIA man, toiling in the conventional black vineyards of Langley. If the wine is occasionally bitter, it may be because he was a unique figure at CIA, a sort of house critic whose unenviable job was to find out what was going wrong in the place and at CIA stations around the world. Kirkpatrick was, for eight years, the CIA's inspector general.

Besides his formal job, it was Kirkpatrick to whom successive directors turned when there was an efficiency study to be done or some particularly delicate bureaucratic shakeup that needed handling. It was not a popular role, and it made him a natural enemy of the "operators," the real cloak-and-dagger boys in the CIA who run the Plans Division (Kirkpatrick delicately avoids naming this or any other division for some reason). This is the half of the agency that overthrows governments and engages in covert political action, as opposed to the more respectable research (Intelligence) division.

It was Kirkpatrick, for example, who found himself cleaning up the mess after the Bay of Pigs, and his critical report to President Kennedy after that fiasco was, in his own words, "bitterly" resented by "those that participated in the operation."

A powerfully built, husky, gray-haired man confined to a wheel chair since a polio attack in 1952, Lyman Kirkpatrick was born in Rochester, N.Y., educated at Princeton and recruited into CIA at the start by way of the wartime Office of Strategic Services, in which he had served as Gen. Omar Bradley's briefing officer during the Battle of the Bulge.

By 1952, Kirkpatrick reports, he had been named chief of an office in the "operational" (i.e., Plans) side of CIA. Then came his crippling illness. While undergoing rigorous physical therapy in New York, he was eased out of his job and "Dick Helms" eased in. Kirkpatrick accepted Allen Dulles' saving offer of the job of inspector general.

Ten years later, CIA director John A. McCone created the new post of executive director for Kirkpatrick, and placed him over the CIA division chiefs, including Richard Helms, by then the DDP (deputy director for Plans). "We were aware," says Kirkpatrick gently, "that this would make the line deputy directors unhappy." But McCone departed and today, by another turn of the wheel, Richard Helms is director of the CIA.

There are some candid admissions. Kirkpatrick just about concedes—and it is the first time anyone from inside the CIA has done so, to my knowledge—that the CIA falsely encouraged leaders of the Cuban brigade to think that if their invasion at the Bay of Pigs failed, President Kennedy would back the landing with U.S. military forces.

There are, as well, revealing insights into the CIA mind. Kirkpatrick tells how during the Batista regime the CIA financed a branch of the Cuban secret service with the unpleasant name of BRAC—Bureau for the Repression of Communist Activities. The CIA was troubled because, it seemed, "most of the money never reached the proper destination." Kirkpatrick personally took several trips to Cuba in an effort to

David Wise, who reports from Washington, is co-author with Thomas B. Ross of *The Intelligence Establishment*, a recent book on international intelligence, and *The Invisible Government*, a critical study of the CIA.

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